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• If  ∈ (0 1), model gives us a theory of gdp growth:
• Also a theory of income distribution: Lorenz curves to come • This paper a purely theoretical inquiry: attempt to see how matching/learning technology just described interacts with an individual control problem 
• This change requires us to specify -the way agents determine their time allocations , given the distributions  ( )
-a new law of motion for  ( ) given agents' policy functions are ( )
• We assume that agents maximize expected PV of earnings, discounted at given   0
• No risk aversion, no theory of real interest rates
• Individual preferences are • A fraction  ( ) of these draws satisfy    and lead agents to leave  Hence
• Next, consider inflow. Agents with cost  ≥  have meetings at the rate (( )) ( )
• Each of these meetings yields a draw  with probability  ( ). Hence
• Combining ins and outs we have law of motion
Definition: An equilibrium, given the initial distribution  ( 0) is a triple (   ) of functions on R 2 + that such that (LM), (BE) are satisfied
• A "mean field game" (Lasry and Lions (2007)) See also Perla and Tonetti (2011) .
Definition: A balanced growth path (BGP) is a number  and a triple of functions (  ) on R + such that
and (   ) is an equilibrium.
• On a BGP output growth is 
• Lorenz curves are constant
• For a BGP with   0 to exist, need an assumption to ensure that the stock of good ideas waiting to be discovered is inexhaustible
• (With lower bound  0  0 to cost, probability mass would pile up at  0  return to search would go to 0, growth would cease)
• Throughout paper we assume that  (0 0) = (0)  0
• Model does not involve distinctions between learning/discovery or imitation/innovation
• A serious limitation?
• Our view expressed well by following passage:
No sharp line divides learning things that are already known to others from learning things that are new to the world. What constitutes novelty depends on what knowledge is already in the mind of the problem solver and what help is received from the environment in adding to this knowledge. We should expect therefore that processes very similar to those employed in learning systems can be used to construct systems that discover new knowledge.
Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial, Third Edition. p. 105.
• Restate (BE), (LM) for BGP only. Use  =   : relative cost • Think this is why successful societies subsidize schooling, create patentand copyright-protected monopoly rents, subsidize basic research
• Can we work out the economically efficient time allocation? Implement it with taxes/subsidies?
• Formulate planning problem
subject to the law of motion for  :
and with  ( ) given.
• Here  maps a set S of density functions into R 
• Have reduced planner's problem from infinite-dimensional to two dimensional problem
• Last term in maximand is new: expected value from improvements in the cost of other types    to  in case they should meet .
• Planner values this external benefit; agent  himself does not
• First order condition is
• Why not third term? Because changing ( ) has no direct effect on the distribution at    which only depends on the search intensities ( ) of those with costs   
• As in decentralized problem, can restate the equations in terms of relative productivities
• Letting  =   we obtain a BGP Bellman equation
• Law of motion for density  and equation for  same as in decentralized equilibrium
• Algorithmic strategy same as in decentralized case, except that (BE) is different • Seek Pigovian tax structure that implements optimal allocation by setting taxes that equate, on the margin, private and social returns to work and search
• Simple one is direct subsidy to search, yielding individual (BE): 
